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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant 
to § 78-2-2 (3) (j) , Utah Code Ann., 1953, as amended. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
1. Whether the trial court, in granting summary judgment 
for Appellees, correctly concluded that Appellant failed to raise 
a material issue of fact sufficient to prevent the trial court 
from ruling as a matter of law as per the specific trust language 
that the interests vested in Appellees by virtue of the 1992 
Betty A. Banks Family Protection Trust were subject only to 
divestiture via a revocation of that trust. Conclusions of the 
trial court with respect to summary judgment are reviewed by the 
appellate court for correctness. Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 
P.2d 104 (Utah 1991). 
2. Whether the trial court could have correctly concluded 
that, even when considering the facts in the light most favorable 
to Appellant, the documents allegedly executed in 1999 by Betty 
Banks were insufficient to either effect the revocation of the 
1992 Betty A. Banks Family Protection Trust or amend that trust 
as a matter of law. An appellate court may affirm a trial 
court' s order granting summary judgment on any ground that was 
available to the trial court even if it was not specifically 
relied upon by the court below. Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 
P.2d 231 (Utah 1993) . This issue was presented to the trial 
court and is preserved by the record. (R.3 75-76). 
3. Whether the trial court, in denying Appellant's Motion 
for Summary Judgment, correctly concluded that Appellees had 
submitted evidence that, when taken in the light most favorable 
to them as the nonmoving party, was sufficient to raise an issue 
of material fact as to whether Ms. Banks was either competent or 
free from undue influence when she allegedly executed certain 
documents in 1999. Ordinarily, the denial of a motion for 
summary judgment is not appealable. Christensen v. Farmers Ins. 
Exch., 443 P.2d 385 (Utah 1968). However, cross-motions for 
summary judgment may be viewed as the independent contention by 
both parties that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law rather than a concession that no question of fact exists 
under the theory advanced by the opposing party. Wycalis v. 
Guardian Title, 780 P.2d 821 (Utah App. 1989), cert, denied, 789 
P.2d 33 (Utah 1990). Nonmoving parties are entitled to have all 
evidence construed in the light most favorable to their position. 
Themy v. Seagull Enters., Inc., 595 P.2d 526 (Utah 1979). 
4. Whether the trial court correctly determined that the 
statements made by attorney Joseph Piatt were admissible when the 
information divulged by Mr. Piatt was not acquired by him in his 
capacity as Appellant' s attorney and it was divulged by him only 
in response to specific questions posed Appellant's counsel. A 
trial court' s interpretation of law is reviewed for correctness 
with some deference being accorded the trial court' s application 
of law to fact. Montes Family v. Carter, 878 P.2d 1168 (Utah 
App. 1994). 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
Cases: Contintental Bank & Trust v. Country Club Mobile Est., 
632 P.2d 869 (Utah 1981) (even revocable trusts vest within trust 
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beneficiaries an enforceable interest in the trust corpus). 
Homer v. Smith, 866 P.2d 622 (Utah App. 1993) (when 
interpreting a contract a court must construe the writing 
according to its plain and ordinary meaning). 
Nielsen v. 0' Reillv. 848 P.2d 664 (Utah 1992) (a 
contract should be read as a whole in an attempt to harmonize and 
give effect to all of the contract' s provisions). 
In re Short, 7 S.W.3d (Mo. App. 1999) (well known 
technical terms should be afforded their technical meanings). 
Themv v. Seagull Enters., Inc., 595 P.2d 526 (Utah 
1979) (nonmoving parties are entitled to have all questions of 
fact resolved in their favor). 
Estate of Jones v. Jones, 759 P.2d 345 (Utah 1988) (the 
presence of undue influence is a question of fact). 
Hilbert v. Benson, 916 P.2d 903 (Wyo. 1996) (the test 
for competency is whether the settlor had the ability to 
comprehend the subject of the trust, its nature and probable 
consequences). 
Colonial Leasing Co. v. Larsen Bros. Constr. Co., 731 
P.2d 483 (Utah 1988) (only complete and facially unambiguous 
documents may be interpreted as a matter of law). 
Gold Standard Inc. v. American Barrick Resource Corp., 
801 P.2d 909 (Utah 1990) (the attorney-client privilege must be 
strictly construed). 
Rules of Evidence: Utah R. Evid 507(a). 
Rules of Civil Procedure: Utah R. Civ. Pro. 56 
Statutes: Utah Code Ann., § 78-24-8(2). 
Restatements: Restatement 2d, Trusts §§ 19, 333 (the test for 
competency is whether the settlor had the ability to comprehend 
the subject of the trust, its nature and probable consequences). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the case. 
The dispute in the present case focuses on issues which 
surround the 1999 modification of the 1992 document entitled "The 
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Betty A. Banks Family Protection Trust." Appellees are the 
children and vested beneficiaries of the 1992 Trust. Appellant 
is the vested beneficiary of the 1999 modification of that trust 
which purports to divest Appellees of their beneficial interests. 
As set forth above, this appeal presents four issues for the 
Court to determine. However, the Court's decision will hinge on 
the Court' s interpretation of the specific language of the 1992 
trust document. If the Court finds, as the trial court found, as 
per the specific language of section 3.2 of the trust document 
that the children' s beneficial interests in the trust corpus were 
subject to divestiture only through the revocation of the trust, 
then this Court should affirm the ruling of the trial court 
below. If, however, the Court finds that the children' s 
interests were subject to divestiture via a modification or 
amendment to the trust, the Court should remand this case to the 
trial court to determine whether the 1999 modification of trust 
was effected while Ms. Banks was competent and free from undue 
influence. 
The remaining issue focuses on the statements made by 
attorney Joseph Piatt in his deposition and in an affidavit 
offered by Appellees in support of their motion for summary 
judgment and in opposition to Appellant' s cross-motion. 
Appellant contends that these statements were improperly admitted 
by virtue of the attorney-client privilege while Appellees 
contend that even if the statements were privileged they were 
properly admitted on account of the nature of the underlying case 
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and the fact that Appellant waived the privilege by eliciting the 
responses from Mr. Piatt during his deposition. 
B. Course of proceedings. 
Pursuant to Rule 24(b)(1) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, Appellees agree that Appellant has accurately 
characterized the course of proceedings. 
C. Disposition of the trial court. 
Pursuant to Rule 24(b)(1) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, Appellees agree that Appellant has accurately 
characterized the disposition of the trial court. 
D. Statement of the facts. 
1. Appellees are the children of the decedent, Betty A. Banks, 
who passed away on August 24, 1999. (R.15, 156). 
2. Appellant is the older sister of the decedent. (R.155). 
3. Attorney Joseph Piatt is the attorney who prepared 
testamentary instruments for both the decedent and Appellant in 
or about April of 1992. (R.388). 
4. Third-party Kevin Reeves is the Appellant's confidant and 
the beneficiary of Appellant's estate. (R.363, citing Deposition 
of Nancy Means, p. 42.12, and Deposition of Joseph Piatt, p. 
69.4). For the sake of candor, Appellant contends that Mr. 
Piatt' s statement concerning Mr. Reeves' status as the 
beneficiary of Appellant' s estate violated attorney-client 
privilege. The trial court admitted this statement. 
5. In April of 1992, the decedent executed a document known as 
"The Betty A. Banks Family Protection Trust," hereinafter 
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referred to as "the 1992 trust." (R.363). 
6. Article I of that document states: "This Trust is 
established for the primary benefit of the Undersigned during the 
Undersigned' s lifetime, for the Undersigned' s family thereafter." 
Article I then proceeds to list the names of the Appellees as the 
only family of the Undersigned. (R.2-3). 
7. Under the terms of the 1992 trust, the decedent, as the 
settlor and trustee, retained the right to enjoy the use of the 
trust corpus as she saw fit until the time of her death with her 
children being named as vested beneficiaries subject to 
divestiture. (R.363). 
8. The 1992 trust also specified that Appellees were to serve 
as joint successor trustees following the Undersigned* s death or 
incapacity. (R.363). 
9 Section 3.2 of the 1992 trust reads: 
Interests of the Beneficiaries. The interests of the 
beneficiaries are presently vested interests subject to 
divestiture which shall continue until this Trust is revoked 
or terminated other than by death. As long as this trust 
subsists, the Trust properties and all the rights and 
privileges hereunder shall be controlled and exercised by 
the Trustee named herein in their fiduciary capacity. (R. 
363) . 
10. Section 3.1 of the 1992 trust reads: 
Rights of the Undersigned. As long as the Undersigned is 
alive, the Undersigned reserves the right to amend, modify 
or revoke this Trust in whole or in part, including the 
principal, and the present or past undisbursed income from 
such principal. Such revocation or amendment of this Trust 
may be in whole or in part by written instrument. 
Amendment, modification or revocation of this instrument 
shall be effective only when such change is delivered in 
writing to the then acting Trustee. On the revocation of 
this instrument in its e entirety, the Trust shall deliver 
to the Undersigned, as the Undersigned may direct in the 
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instrument of revocation, all of the Trust property. 
(R.212). 
11. At no point in time subsequent to the execution of the 1992 
trust did the decedent have a falling out with the beneficiaries 
of that trust. (R.363). 
12. In fact, notwithstanding that each of Appellees resided 
outside of the State of Utah, Appellees each made consistent 
efforts to visit and call the decedent until the time of her 
death in August of 1999. (R.363). In fact, Appellant has 
conceded that the decedent maintained warm relations with her 
children until the time of her passing. Brief of the Appellant, 
p.6.6. 
13. In early 1999, the decedent began experiencing a 
deterioration of her health that eventually required extended 
hospitalization. (R.361). 
14. At substantially that same time in early 1999, Appellant, 
together with Kevin Reeves, began to inquire of the decedent 
exactly how she had devised her estate. (R.361). 
15. In response to these inquiries, the decedent gave answers to 
Appellant and Mr. Reeves that did not accurately reflect her 
then current estate plans: she informed them that Appellant was 
the beneficiary of the trust which she executed in 1992. 
Deposition of Kevin Reeves, p. 19.18-20.18, (R.369). 
16. Not satisfied with the decedent's response to his inquiry, 
Mr. Reeves took it upon himself to search for the decedent' s 
estate plans so that he might ascertain for himself whether the 
decedent had in fact, devised her estate to Appellant. (R.364). 
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17. In February of 1999, at substantially the same time when 
Appellant and Mr. Reeves began searching for the decedent1 s 
estate plans, the decedent, concealing this fact from Appellant 
and Mr. Reeves, gave the original 1992 trust and will to Appellee 
Susan Banks for safekeeping together with the instructions that 
Ms. Banks would need those documents upon the decedent's passing. 
(R.364) . 
18. When Mr. Reeves was unable to locate the documents at issue, 
Mr. Reeves persisted in calling attorney Joseph Piatt 
approximately twenty times with the goal of obtaining a copy of 
the 1992 estate documents so that he would be able to ascertain 
for himself whether the decedent had in fact devised her estate 
to Appellant as she had previously represented. (R.3 64). 
19. Mr. Reeves and Mr. Piatt offer significantly different 
versions of the events which culminated in the 1999 amendment to 
the 1992 trust. (R.364). 
20. According to Mr. Reeves, after he had tried approximately 
twenty times to reach Mr. Piatt by phone, Mr. Piatt finally 
returned Mr. Reeves' phone call. (R.364). 
a. During this initial phone conversation, Mr. Reeves gave 
the telephone to the decedent who then informed Mr. Piatt that 
she wished to obtain a copy of her estate planning documents. 
(R.364) . 
b. Thereafter, Mr. Reeves obtained the documents at issue 
from Mr. Piatt. (R.364). 
c. Upon obtaining the documents from Mr. Piatt, Mr. Reeves 
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proceeded to read the documents to the decedent, who by this time 
was hospitalized for her progressing illness. (R.364). 
d. After hearing Mr. Reeves1 recital in which Appellees 
rather than Appellant stood to take the decedent1 s estate upon 
her passing, the decedent allegedly informed Mr. Reeves that the 
documents did not reflect either her current or past intentions 
and that she instead wished for Appellant to receive her entire 
estate. (R.364). 
e. Mr. Reeves, upon hearing the decedent express her 
wishes as such, persisted in calling Mr. Piatt to prevail upon 
him the necessity of coming to the hospital to visit with the 
decedent so that she could personally express to Mr. Piatt her 
desire to amend her estate plans. (R.365). 
f. After breaking many appointments to meet with the 
decedent, Mr. Piatt finally showed up one day, unannounced, at 
the decedent' s hospital room while Mr. Reeves happened to be 
present. (R.365). 
g. Prior to this meeting, Mr. Reeves claims to have never 
met Mr. Piatt. (R.365). 
h. During the meeting at the hospital room, Mr. Piatt and 
the decedent discussed which changes the decedent wished to make 
to her to her estate plans. (R.365). 
I. Mr. Reeves claims to have been present during the 
entire meeting that day and to have overheard the entire 
conversation day between Mr. Piatt and the decedent, including 
the instructions which the decedent gave Mr. Piatt. (R.365). 
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j. During the conversation between Mr. Piatt and the 
decedent, Mr. Reeves claims to have witnessed Mr. Piatt make 
notations on a pad of paper which he subsequently had the 
decedent sign. When Mr. Reeves questioned Mr. Piatt about the 
signed notation, Mr. Piatt allegedly answered that the signed 
notation was sufficient to effect the amendment of the 1992 trust 
and the no further signature from the decedent would be required. 
(R.365). 
k. Unsatisfied with Mr. Piatt' s response, Mr. Reeves 
prevailed upon Mr. Piatt to generate more substantial documents 
for the decedent to sign. (R.365). 
1. Thereafter, Mr. Reeves appeared at Mr. Piatt's office 
to retrieve the proposed amendments in printed form, and 
notwithstanding Mr. Piatt' s statement that the documents required 
no additional signature from the decedent, Mr. Reeves took the 
documents to Ms. Banks for her signature. (R.365). 
m. After the decedent signed the documents which Mr. 
Reeves had delivered to her, Mr. Reeves returned the documents to 
Mr. Piatt who promptly notarized a signature that he had not 
witnessed. (R.365). 
21. Mr. Piatt offers the following version the events: 
a. In the late summer of 1999, Mr. Piatt began receiving 
telephone messages from an individual who represented himself to 
be Kevin Reeves and that he spoke for the decedent who wished to 
make amendments to her then existing estate plans. Mr. Piatt 
denies speaking to the decedent by telephone on that day. (R. 
10 
365-66). 
b. Because Mr. Piatt did not know whether Mr. Reeves did 
in fact speak for the decedent, Mr. Piatt did not immediately 
begin preparing a new set of trust documents, or any amendment 
thereto, which reflected the requested changes or amendments. 
(R.366). 
c. At some point in time subsequent to their initial 
conversation, Mr. Piatt states that Mr. Reeves showed up at his 
office unannounced and that Mr. Reeves stated that he would not 
leave until he received a satisfactory resolution to the matter. 
(R. 366) . 
d. At that time, Mr. Piatt prepared a handwritten note 
stating that the decedent wished to make changes in her estate 
plans with respect to the existing beneficiaries. Mr. Piatt gave 
this note to Mr. Reeves with the instruction that Mr. Reeves 
should deliver the note to the decedent, have the decedent sign 
the note and then return the note to his office as evidence of 
the decedent's desire to actually change her trust. (R.366). 
e. Mr. Reeves subsequently returned with the signed note 
purporting to bear the decedent's signature. (R.366). 
f. After receiving the signed note from Mr. Reeves, Mr. 
Piatt prepared two separate pages of proposed changes to the 
trust and delivered them to the decedent at the hospital for her 
review as an intermediate step before preparing a restatement of 
the entire trust. (R.366). 
g. Mr. Piatt did not present these pages to the decedent 
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with the intention that she should sign or initial them, and at 
no time did the decedent initial or sign these pages in Mr. 
Piatt's presence. Moreover, Mr. Piatt does not believe that he 
himself ever notarized the document or authorized another in his 
stead to notarize the document notwithstanding the stamp bearing 
his name. Lending credence to Mr. Piatt's belief that he never 
notarized the document is the fact that the amendment to the 1992 
trust occurred in August of 1999, but Mr. Piatt' s supposed 
affirmation of the decedent' s signature bears the date of the 
1992 trust rather than the date when he supposedly witnessed the 
decedent' s signature. (R.237, 366) . 
h. At no time, notwithstanding Appellant' s representation 
to the contrary, did Mr. Piatt ever prepare an entire trust 
document for the decedent to sign; rather, Mr. Piatt simply 
prepared separate pages of proposed amendments which would be 
incorporated into a formal restatement of trust that he intended 
to prepare at a later time. The two pages that Mr. Piatt 
prepared incorporated proposed changes to section 4.3 
(distribution) and to section 6.6 (trustee). Deposition of 
Joseph Piatt, p.50.16-22., (R.642). 
I. Mr. Piatt never prepared a formal instrument revoking 
the 1992 trust. (R.642). 
j. The 1999 amendment to the 1992 trust, although 
purporting to divest Appellees of their vested beneficial 
interests, retains the exact language of the 1992 trust with 
respect to Article I: 
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1.1 Purpose of the Trust. This Trust is established 
for the primary benefit of the Undersigned during the 
Undersigned1 s lifetime, for the Undersigned' s family 
thereafter. At the signing of this Trust, the Undersigned 
is not married. 
1.2 The family of the Undersigned consists of: 
KENNETH ALAN BANKS, January 12, 193 8 
SUSAN BANKS BAKER, March 20, 194 0 
BRANSFORD MICHAEL BANKS, April 20, 1945 
(R.227). 
k. At the time Mr. Piatt delivered the proposed amendments 
to the decedent in the hospital, he was concerned about her 
competency and whether she was free from undue influence. (R. 
366) . 
1. Mr. Piatt has called Mr. Reeves version of the events 
"a complete fabrication." (R.367). 
22. The decedent died fifteen days after Mr. Piatt visited her 
in the hospital. (R.156). 
23. During the course of the ensuing litigation, on or about 
January 6 and 7, 2000, Appellees' counsel had occasion to depose 
Appellant. During that deposition, Appellees sought to pursue a 
line of questioning relating to Appellant' s own estate 
provisions. Appellant objected and subsequently obtained a 
protective order limiting that line of questioning to the plans 
which Appellant had made prior to the decedent' s passing. 
(R.84) . 
24. On or about March 9, 2000, the parties deposed attorney 
Joseph Piatt. During the course that deposition, Appellant's 
counsel inquired of Mr. Piatt whether he had had any 
conversations with Appellant recently. Mr. Piatt responded: 
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No. I had one conversation with her several months ago. I 
called her and asked her how she felt about all of this. 
She is my client, also. And I wanted to make sure that she 
was okay with what was happening. I wanted to make sure she 
didn' t feel like Kevin was unduly influencing her. I 
confirmed in my own mind whether she understood that if 
Betty died Betty' s estate was now going to go to Nancy. 
Nancy is going to die and Kevin is going to end up with that 
I just wanted to make sure she understood that. (R.424). 
25. Appellant's counsel did not object to this answer and in 
fact continued with a line of questioning that was designed to 
elicit the responses to which Appellant now objects: 
Q: How do you know that occurred? 
A: Who do I--
Q: How do you know that Mr. Reeves would end up with the 
estate? 
A: Because Nancy told me. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court correctly granted Appellees' motion for 
summary judgment in this matter; notwithstanding questions of 
fact that prevented the trial court from granting Appellant' s 
motion, the trial court correctly concluded that even when 
construing the questions of fact in the light most favorable to 
Appellant, these questions of fact were immaterial to Appellees' 
argument and Appellees were entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law. 
The 1992 trust, even though revocable and subject to 
amendment, vested within Appellees a beneficial interest in the 
decedent's estate. This interest was not contingent. Pursuant 
to the explicit terms of the trust document, the vested 
beneficial interest that Appellees enjoyed was subject to 
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divestiture only through a revocation of that trust. 
The term revocation is not synonymous with either the term 
modification or with the term amendment. These terms are 
technical terms under the law and should be afforded their 
technical meanings. 
Once a settlor creates a trust, even though that trust may 
be revocable and subject to amendment, a settlor and trustee are 
bound by the specific language of that trust and may not exercise 
authority over the trust in a manner that is inconsistent with 
the trust's explicit language. 
In the present case, section 3.2 of the trust specifically 
states that the interests of Appellees were vested interests 
subject to divestiture only via a revocation of the trust. Even 
if the 1999 amendment to the 1992 trust was made while the 
decedent was competent and free from undue influence, the 1999 
amendment was not a revocation of that trust. Therefore, the 
1999 amendment was insufficient to divest Appellees of their 
beneficial interests and Appellees are entitled to their 
beneficial interests. 
However, even if the Court finds that the Appellees' 
beneficial interest was subject to divestiture via an amendment 
or modification, this Court should remand this matter to the 
trial court; not only is the denial of summary judgment not a 
final order which can be appealed, there remain questions of 
fact, as set forth above, surrounding the 1999 amendment that 
prevent judgment from being entered in Appellant' s favor as a 
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matter of law. As the non-moving party with respect to 
Appellant' s motion, Appellees are entitled to have each question 
of fact resolved in their favor, and it does not necessarily 
follow that simply because both parties may have moved the trial 
court for summary judgment that both parties concede that no 
questions of fact exist under the theory of the case propounded 
by the opposing party. 
Finally, the trial court did not err in allowing the 
statements made by attorney Joseph Piatt to be admitted in this 
matter. The statements made by Mr. Piatt were unrelated to Mr. 
Piatt's previous representation of the Appellant, the Appellant 
was not the personal representative of the decedent who could 
claim the privilege under Rule 504® of the Utah Rules of Evidence 
on the decedent' s behalf, and the Appellant waived any privilege 
she may have otherwise claimed when her attorney' s own question 
elicited the response to which Appellant now objects. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT, 
Because the disposition of a case by summary judgment denies 
the losing party the benefit of a trial on the merits, the 
appellate court must review the evidence presented in the light 
which is most favorable to that party and then affirm only when 
it appears that no genuine dispute of material fact exists, or 
where, even according to the facts as contended by the losing 
party, the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law. Themy v. Seagull Enters. Inc., 595 P.2d 526 (Utah 1979). 
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However, an appellate court may affirm a trial court' s order 
granting summary judgment on any ground that was available to the 
trial court even if it was not specifically relied upon by the 
trial court. Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 .2d 231 (Utah 
1993). In the present case, a material dispute exists as to the 
validity of the 1999 amendment to the decedent's 1992 trust. 
However, even when the Court resolves this dispute of fact in 
Appellant' s favor, Appellees are still entitled to summary 
judgment because the 1999 amendment is insufficient to divest 
them of the beneficial interest that vested in them by operation 
of the 1992 trust as a matter of law. 
A. EVEN IF VALID, THE 1999 AMENDMENT DOES NOT DIVEST 
APPELLEES OF THE INTERESTS THAT THEY ACQUIRED VIA OPERATION 
OF THE 1992 TRUST, 
By its own terms, the 1992 trust was both revocable and 
subject to amendment. The primary purpose of this trust was to 
provide for the decedent who simultaneously occupied the 
positions of settlor, trustee and beneficiary. Indeed, by the 
terms of the trust, the decedent was the sole active beneficiary. 
However, the 1992 trust also vested in Appellees a beneficial 
interest that was subject to divestiture only by a revocation of 
that trust. That revocation never occurred. Appellees are 
therefore entitled to their beneficial interest set forth in the 
1992 trust notwithstanding the validity of the 1999 amendment and 
this Court should affirm the trial court' s order. 
Even revocable trusts vest within the trust beneficiaries an 
enforceable interest in the trust corpus. Continental Bank v. 
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Country Club Mobile Est., 632 P.2d 869 (Utah 1981); Matter of 
Estate and Trust of Pilafas, 836 P.2d 420 (Ariz. App. 1996). 
"These interests cannot be taken from the beneficiaries except in 
accordance with a provision of the trust instrument, or by their 
own acts, or by a decree of a court." Pilafas, supra, at 423, 
citing, George G. Bogart and George T. Bogart, Trusts and 
Trustees § 998 (2d. ed. Rev. 1983). Accordingly, the explicit 
terms of the trust limit the power of both the settlor and the 
trustee over the trust and this limitation remains even when the 
settlor has appointed himself trustee for his own benefit. 
Continental Bankf supra, 872; Pilafas, supra, 423; Kline v. Utah 
Dept. of Health, 776 P.2d 57, 61 (Utah App. 1989); see also, 
Estate of Brenner, 547 P.2d 938, 942 (Colo. App. 1976). 
Therefore, absent fraud or mistake, neither of which has been 
alleged surrounding the creation of the 1992 trust, a settlor has 
the power to modify or revoke a trust only if and to the specific 
extent that such a power was explicitly reserved by the terms of 
the trust itself. Kline, supra, 61; Bogert and Bogert, Trusts 
and Trustees, § 1001 (where a settlor reserves a power to revoke 
the trust in a particular manner, he can revoke it only in that 
manner). 
In the present case, it is not disputed that had the 
decedent reserved the power to terminate Appellees' interest in 
the trust via an amendment to the trust rather than by a 
revocation of the trust, she clearly could have done so. 
However, she did not reserve this power. Rather, she reserved 
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only the power to terminate Appellees interest in the 1992 trust 
by a revocation of the trust. And once the decedent divested 
herself of the legal title to the trust corpus, the formalities 
and terms of the trust document limited her authority to control 
the trust corpus thereafter. These formalities cannot be 
abridged notwithstanding the powers of reservation which the 
settlor could have made but did not make. Continental Bank, 
supra, illustrates this point. 
In Continental Bank, a settlor owned property subject to a 
six year option to buy held by a third party. Thereafter, the 
settlor conveyed this property to a trustee to be held in trust 
for various members of his family. The settlor retained the 
right to revoke and amend the trust but granted the trustee broad 
authority to manage the trust. The authority granted to the 
trustee included the right to grant options. Subsequent to 
divesting himself of legal title, the settlor extended the third 
party* s option to buy. Shortly after the settlor' s death, and 
after the expiration of the original option to buy, the third 
party sought to exercise the second option leading the trustee to 
initiate a quiet title action. In holding that the settlor' s 
extension of the option to buy was without legal effect, the 
Court advocated a formalistic analysis rather than the intent 
based approach advocated by the dissent: "once the settlor has 
created the trust he is no longer the owner of the trust property 
and has only such ability to deal with it as is expressly 
reserved to him in the trust instrument." Ld., at 872 (citations 
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omitted). Thus, the Court noted that even though the settlor 
could have properly achieved the desired result by adhering to 
the trust formalities--i.e., revoking the trust and then granting 
the extension--the settlor' s failure to so adhere rendered his 
extension void. 
A formalistic analysis yields the same result in the present 
case: even if valid, the decedent's failure to adhere to the 
trust formalities renders the 1999 amendment ineffective to 
divest Appellees of their beneficial interests. 
Sections 3.1 and 3.2 of the trust control this analysis. 
3.1 Rights of the Undersigned. As long as the 
Undersigned is alive, the Undersigned reserves the right to 
amend, modify or revoke this trust in whole or in part, 
including the principal, and the present or past undisbursed 
income from such principal. Such revocation or amendment of 
this Trust may be in whole or in part by written instrument. 
Amendment, modification or revocation of this instrument 
shall be effective only when the change is delivered in 
writing to the then acting Trustee. On the revocation of 
this instrument in its entirety, the Trustee shall deliver 
to the Undersigned, as the Undersigned may direct in the 
instrument of revocation, all of the trust property. 
3.2 Interests of the Beneficiaries. The interests of 
the beneficiaries are presently vested interests subject to 
divestment which shall continue until this trust is revoked 
or terminated other by death. As long as this trust 
subsists, the Trust properties and all the rights and 
privileges hereunder shall be controlled and exercised by 
the Trustee in their fiduciary capacity. 
Section 3.1, governs the rights which the decedent retained over 
the trust subsequent to divesting herself of legal title. 
Section 3.2 outlines the rights which Appellees received by 
virtue of the decedent's conveyance in trust. In tandem, the two 
provisions provide the formalistic framework that govern the 
Court's analysis. 
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Under section 3.1, the decedent, in her capacity as settlor, 
reserved the right to amend, modify or revoke the trust. Section 
3.1 specifies, however, that such amendment, modification or 
revocation would be effective only when such change was delivered 
to the then acting trustee. Until that time, the terms of the 
1992 unamended trust govern. Section 3.2 of the trust then 
states that the rights which the Appellees received were 
presently vested rights, and although these rights were subject 
to divestiture, these rights were to continue until the trust was 
revoked or terminated other than by death. Thus, even though the 
decedent, in her capacity as settlor, retained the right to 
divest Appellees of their beneficial interests, her power to 
effect such divestiture was limited by the trust1 s expressed 
terms; and the trust specified that she could only accomplish 
this end via a revocation of the trust. 
Two brief asides are worth noting here. First, the decedent 
retained the power to amend the trust. Thus, it is conceivable 
that had she delivered in writing to the acting trustee an 
amendment to the trust that permitted a divestiture of the 
Appellees through amendment or modification, rather than 
revocation, she could have done so. However, there has been no 
evidence presented to show that the decedent ever attempted such 
amendment. Second, the decedent, in her capacity as settlor, 
granted to the trustee the authority to use both the trust income 
and the trust principal for the decedent' s benefit as the sole 
active beneficiary. Obviously, to the extent that the trustee* s 
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duties required her to invade the trust principal, the trustee 
possessed a limited power to effect at least a partial revocation 
of the trust. Again, however, this issue is not before the Court 
inasmuch as it is clear that the 1999 amendment was an action 
made by the decedent in her capacity as settlor. 
Leaving behind those two asides, it is clear that the two 
single sheets which the decedent purportedly initialed were not a 
revocation of the trust; rather they were merely an attempted 
modification. The terms amendment, modification and revocation 
are not synonymous but are instead well-known technical terms. 
Under the law, words with a well-known technical meaning should 
be construed according to their technical meaning unless a 
contrary meaning appears in the granting instrument. In re 
Short, 7 S.W.3d (Mo. App. 1999). Black's Law Dictionary defines 
the terms as follows: 
Amend. To improve. To change for the better by removing 
defects or faults. To change, correct, revise. 
Amendment. To change or modify for the better. To alter 
by modification, deletion, or addition. 
Modification. A change; an alteration or amendment which 
introduces new elements into the details, or cancels some of 
them, but leaves the general purpose and effect of the 
subject matter intact. 
Modify. To alter; to change in incidental or subordinate 
features; enlarge, extend; amend; limit, reduce. Such 
alteration or change may be characterized, in quantitative 
sense, as either an increase or decrease. 
Revocation. The withdrawal or recall of some power, 
authority, or thing granted, or a destroying or making void 
of some will, deed, or offer that had been valid until 
revoked. 
Revoke. To annul or make void by recalling or taking back. 
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To cancel, rescind, repeal, or reverse, as to revoke a 
license or will. Black's Law Dictionary, (6th ed. 1990). 
Thus, while amendment and modification contemplate continuity of 
the subject matter subsequent to a change, the term revocation 
indicates a destruction of the subject matter altogether. 
No contrary meanings to these definitions are present within 
the trust. In fact, the technical distinction is evident in the 
explicit trust language. Section 3.1 states: "On the revocation 
of this instrument in its entirety, the Trustee shall deliver to 
the Undersigned, as the Undersigned may direct in the instrument 
of revocation, all of the Trust property." In other words, upon 
the revocation of the trust, the trust would cease to subsist and 
the trustee was to restore to the settlor all of the property 
which she held in trust, thereby extinguishing the relationship 
between the parties. No similar instruction accompanies the 
reservation of power to modify or amend the trust. The 
implication is obvious; if the settlor chose to amend or modify 
the trust the trust would continue to exist. 
Viewed in this context, it is clear that the 1999 amendment 
which purports to divest Appellees of their beneficial interests, 
was not the type of event that contemplated the termination of 
the trust in its entirety. Rather, it was merely a change 
incidental to the trust itself. And under the trust' s own terms, 
because Appellees' vested interest in the trust corpus were to 
continue as long as the trust subsisted, it was insufficient to 
divest Appellees of their interests. 
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B. APPELLANT' S ARGUMENTS IGNORE THE TRUST' S UNAMBIGUOUS 
MEANING. 
In her brief, Appellant sets forth five separate arguments 
as to the trial court's misinterpretation of the 1992 trust. 
Without exception these arguments ignore the trust' s plain and 
unambiguous meaning. 
First, Appellant argues that section 3.1 of the trust is the 
controlling section "as to modifications of the Trust including 
the creation and removal of contingent beneficial interests" 
because section 3.2 merely recites a formality to ensure that the 
trust is not illusory under the law. Brief of the Appellant, p. 
15. In support of this proposition, Appellant recalls historical 
cases which have held that revocable trusts were not illusory 
because they created in the beneficiary a presently vested 
interest which was to coincide with the trust itself. Under the 
Appellant's argument, because section 3.2 merely restates the 
law, the Court should look to section 3.1 as the controlling 
section. Appellant cites In re Estate of Groesbeck, 935 P.2d 
1255 (Utah 1997) to bolster this point. In that case, the Court 
determined that the decedent' s revocable trust was not illusory 
because vested interests were created at the trust' s inception. 
The Court determined that simply because these interests were 
subject to divestiture did not make the trust illusory. 
In the present case, however, neither party contends that 
the 1992 trust is illusory. Groesbeck is therefore inapplicable 
to the proposition which Appellant has set forth: that the Court 
should ignore the plain language of section 3.2 in favor of 
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section 3.1. 
It is axiomatic that when interpreting a contract a court 
must construe the writing according to its plain and ordinary 
meaning. Homer v. Smith, 866 P.2d 622, 629 (Utah App. 1993). 
Moreover, the contract should be read as a whole, in an attempt 
to harmonize and give effect to all of the contract provisions. 
Nielsen v. 0' Reilly, 848 P.2d 664 (Utah 1992). Appellant's 
position ignores this maxim. Instead, Appellant' s argument 
unnecessarily privileges section 3.1 over section 3.2 while 
Appellees interpretation harmonizes and gives equal weight to 
both: the decedent retained the right to amend and modify the 
trust, but if the decedent wished to divest the beneficiaries of 
their vested rights, she was required to revoke the trust. 
Moreover, only Appellees position may be read in harmony with 
Article I of the trust which states that the purpose of the 
trust, after providing for the decedent during her lifetime, was 
to provide for Appellees. 
Appellant' s first argument belies her second in which she 
posits that section 3.2 actually means that the interests of the 
beneficiaries were subject to divestiture via amendment and 
revocation. In submitting that claim, Appellant attempts to 
parse the language of section 3.2 by dividing modifying phrases 
to arrive at what is apparently a contradictory conclusion with 
the position that she advances. Without attempting to recreate 
Appellant' s somewhat confusing method, the correct interpretation 
of section 3.2 is as follows: Section 3.2, by its plain language, 
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defines the rights which the beneficiaries received by the 
creation of the trust. The term of art which described this 
right is a presently vested beneficial interest which was subject 
to being divested. Section 3.2 then specifies that this right 
was to continue for as long as the trust remained in effect. 
Thus, as long as the trust existed, the Appellees interest in the 
trust existed as well. 
Appellant1 s confusion apparently stems from the phrase 
"subject to divestment" which she mistakenly separates from the 
phrase "presently vested interests" rather than reading them 
together as a whole to describe the interest that Appellees 
received. The Groesbeck case, supra, from which Appellant 
herself quotes illustrates this error. Appellant has previously 
noted the similarities between the language in the Groesbeck 
trust and the 1992 trust executed by the decedent. Brief of the 
Appellant, p. 14. In fact, section 3.2 is nearly identical to 
Article VI C of the Groesbeck trust. Article VI C of the 
Groesbeck trust states: "The interests of the beneficiaries is a 
present interest which shall continue until this Trust is revoked 
or terminated other than by death." Thus, the only difference 
with respect to the two sections is that the 1992 trust gives a 
more detailed description to what the Groesbeck trust simply 
calls a "present interest." Appellant is therefore incorrect 
when she separates the phrase "subject to divestment" from the 
phrase "presently vested interests" to derive the significance 
that she propounds in her brief. 
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Appellant* s third argument is merely the conclusory 
statement that the trial court's interpretation of section 3.2 
stripped section 3.1 of its meaning with respect to partial 
revocations. Appellant offers no support for this proposition, 
however. Therefore, Appellees respectfully request this Court, 
pursuant to Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, to 
disregard this portion of Appellant's brief. See also, Burns v. 
Summerhavs, 927 P.2d 197 (Utah App. 1997) (where appellant failed 
to provide adequate legal analysis and legal authority in support 
of his claims, his assertions did not permit appellate review). 
To the extent, however, that Appellant' s third argument merely 
restates arguments presented elsewhere, Appellees respectfully 
refer the Court to those areas of this brief. 
Appellant' s fourth argument, to a certain degree, develops 
the argument which Appellant failed to support in her third: the 
decedent retained the right to effect partial as well as total 
revocations of the trust. If evidence exists, and Appellant 
claims it does, that indicates the decedent effected a partial 
revocation of the trust then that partial revocation is 
sufficient to divest Appellees of their vested interests. This 
argument fails as a matter of law. 
Appellees do not dispute that the decedent retained the 
right to partially revoke the trust. Instead, Appellees dispute 
that a partial revocation, even if so effected, would have the 
legal consequence that Appellant asserts. As set forth above, 
the decedent had at her disposal two methods of effecting a 
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partial revocation: First, as the settlor, and in compliance with 
the instructions set forth in section 3.1, the decedent clearly 
could have withdrawn certain property from the trust corpus. 
Once the settlor withdrew this property from the trust, neither 
the trustee nor the beneficiaries would have any legal 
relationship or claim to this property. Second, as the trustee, 
and in compliance with section 2.1 of the trust, the decedent 
could have determined that the property was required to meet the 
decedent' s needs in her capacity as the active beneficiary of the 
trust. Again, once this property was removed from the trust, 
neither the trustee nor the beneficiaries would have standing to 
claim an interest in that property. In both cases, however, 
notwithstanding the partial revocation, the underlying trust 
would continue to subsist and the relationships defined by that 
trust would continue with respect to the property left 
undisturbed. See, Matter of Estate of West, 948 P.2d 351, 354 
(Utah 1997). 
Notwithstanding the language that Appellant uses to phrase 
her argument, Appellant is not claiming that either the settlor 
or the trustee removed property from the trust. Therefore, 
Plaintiff's fourth argument, at its essence, is unrelated to the 
issue of whether a partial revocation could effect Appellees' 
divestiture. Instead, Appellant is arguing that the Court need 
not be troubled with trust formalities and that the decedent' s 
alleged amendment should be sufficient to divest Appellees 
notwithstanding the plain language of section 3.2 because the 
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decedent also retained the right to revoke the trust. 
In support of this position, Appellant cites authorities 
which are largely inapplicable to the facts before the Court: 
Scott on Trusts, § 331.1 (3d ed. 1967) and In re Schautz, 151 
A.2d 457 (Penn. 1959). These authorities stand for the 
proposition that where a settlor reserved the power to revoke the 
trust, the settlor' s power to also amend the trust would be 
inferred even if the settlor failed to explicitly reserve such 
power. Thus, a settlor could properly amend the trust without 
first revoking the trust. In the present case, however, the 
decedent clearly reserved the power to modify the trust and 
distinguished this power from the power to revoke the trust. 
Moreover, unlike the situations set forth in the authorities 
cited by Appellant, the decedent specifically stated that the 
interests which Appellees enjoyed were to co-exist with the trust 
during the trust's subsistence. Thus, even were the Court 
generally inclined to interpret Appellant' s authorities as 
removing the formalistic barrier which required revocation before 
amendment, that interpretation would have no bearing on the 
present case; to give effect to this trust' s plain language, the 
Court can only find that Appellees' interest were subject to 
divestment only via a revocation of the trust. 
An aside relevant to this point: Appellant has previously 
set forth that trust provisions such as section 3.2 find their 
genesis in law discussing the legal effect of revocable inter 
vivos trusts. The implication of this statement is that section 
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3.2 is merely a formal necessity that prevents the trust from 
being illusory rather than a statement that reflects the 
settlor's intent. The connotation is that section 3.2's literal 
reading should be subordinated to other sections, particularly 
section 3.1. However, neither the implication nor the 
connotation accurately reflects the law concerning trusts; 
section 3.2 was simply not needed to prevent the trust from being 
illusory under the law. 
In Sundguist v. Sundquist, 639 P.2d 181, 183 (Utah 1981), 
the Court, in giving effect to an undocumented trust, 
specifically stated: "The settlor need not sign a formal trust 
instrument or employ any particular form of words." Rather, a 
settlor need only have a present intent to create a presently 
enforceable trust, have property set aside, and then specify the 
essential terms of a trust in such manner that a court could 
enforce the duties which comprise the sine qua non of the trust. 
Id. at 184. In the present case, the application of this finding 
defeats both Appellant' s implication and its accompanying 
connotation: even were 3.2 absent from the trust, the trust would 
still have been enforceable under the law. Section 3.2 was 
simply not required merely as a formal necessity to prevent the 
trust from being illusory. In fact it was not required at all. 
Therefore, its inclusion cannot merely be dismissed as a 
formality rather than a statement of intent. Thus, section 3.2 
should be afforded status equal to other provisions in the trust 
and read so as to give full effect to its plain language. Homer 
30 
v. Smith, supra; Nielsen v. O' Reilly, supra. When section 3.2 is 
interpreted in this manner, the only interpretation which gives 
equal weight to this provision is the reading which finds that 
the rights of the Appellees were subject to divestment only 
through a revocation of the trust. 
Appellant's fifth argument is also unpersuasive. Under this 
theory, section 3.2 of the trust refers not to Appellees but only 
to the decedent inasmuch as she was the only active beneficiary 
of the trust. Although Appellant cites Matter of Estate of West, 
supra, in support of this proposition, this argument may be 
disposed of simply by referencing the trust document itself. 
Under the terms of the 1992 trust, the term beneficiaries clearly 
refers to all persons who could claim a beneficial interest under 
the trust: in this case the decedent and the Appellees. First, 
the term beneficiaries is the plural of the term beneficiary. If 
the Court construes this plural noun according to its plain 
meaning, the Court must conclude that section 3.2 applies to more 
than one beneficiary. Aside from the Appellees and the decedent, 
no other persons are mentioned in the trust. Therefore, the 
Court must conclude that the settlor intended section 3.2 to 
govern the interests of both the decedent and the Appellees. 
Second, the settlor, when referring only to the decedent' s 
beneficial interest elsewhere in the trust, does not refer to the 
decedent as the beneficiary. Rather, she is referred to as the 
Undersigned, a term which is also used to occasionally, and 
confusingly, designate the settlor. For example, in section 2.1, 
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the trustee is authorized to make payments for the benefit and 
maintenance of the Undersigned. Section 2.1 does not use the 
term beneficiary at any time, but obviously, a trustee holds 
legal title to property to be used only for the benefit of the 
beneficiary as opposed to the settlor, who has divested himself 
of both legal and beneficial title. Thus, when section 3.2 
authorizes payment by the trustee to the Undersigned, the 
Undersigned is clearly a beneficiary of the trust. 
Finally, Matter of Estate of West simply does not stand for 
the proposition which Appellant asserts. The West case stands 
for the proposition that a sole surviving trustee who is also the 
trust1 s sole active beneficiary may exercise by himself all of 
the powers which he could have exercised jointly with a co-
trustee, and that he could do so without breaching an owed 
fiduciary duty to beneficiaries who were subject to divestiture. 
Nowhere in the West opinion does the Court state that 
beneficiaries subject to divestiture are not beneficiaries. 
Rather, it states that these beneficiaries could not assert a 
claim for breach of fiduciary duty since their rights had not 
ripened at that point. Thus, Appellant's fifth argument must 
fail as a matter of law and the Court should find that section 
3.2 applies to Appellees as well as the decedent. 
Appellant' s sixth argument is a policy argument which is 
simply not well reasoned. Appellant contends that under the 
trial court' s ruling, a settlor of a revocable trust subject to 
amendment could only divest beneficiaries via a revocation of the 
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trust in its entirety. In fact, the trial court' s ruling carries 
no such implication. Rather, the trial court' s ruling has no 
implication beyond the present case other than to ensure that 
full weight and effect are given to a trust' s explicit terms. 
This is already the law in Utah. The only beneficiaries who 
could not be divested of their interests via an amendment to the 
trust, would be those beneficiaries whose interests under the 
trust' s plain language were to continue until the trust was 
revoked. The Court should therefore affirm the trial court' s 
order granting summary judgment. 
C. THE COURT MAY FIND AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT THE 1999 
AMENDMENT FAILS AS AN AMENDMENT TO THE 1992 TRUST, 
Although not relied on specifically by the trial court 
below, this Court may find that the 1999 amendment to the 1992 
trust fails as a matter of law and affirm the trial court' s order 
granting summary judgment to Appellees. An appellate court may 
affirm a trial court' s order granting summary judgment on any 
ground that was available to the trial court even if it was not 
specifically relied upon by the court below. Higgins v. Salt 
Lake County, supra. This issue was presented to the trial court 
on pages 18 and 19 of the Appellees' Memorandum in Opposition to 
Defendant' s Motion for Summary Judgment and in Support of 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment and is preserved by the 
record on pages 375 and 376. 
In 1996, the Washington Court of Appeals handed down a 
decision in a case remarkably similar to the case before the 
Court today: In re Tosh, 920 P.2d 1230 (Wash.App. Div. 1 1996). 
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If this Court were to adopt the standard promulgated by the 
Washington court, this Court could determine as a matter of law 
that even if the decedent actually intended to amend the 1992 
trust by inserting two pages of proposed amendments into the 
existing 1992 trust, that such amendment was invalid and 
therefore insufficient to vest in Appellant any enforceable 
interest in the 1992 trust corpus. 
In the Tosh case, a settlor created an original revocable 
trust in which he gave his companion a life estate in a duplex 
with the remainder split between his two daughters. Thereafter, 
he consulted an attorney for the express purpose of amending his 
trust to leave the duplex to his companion outright. In 
preparing the amendment, the attorney simply substituted one page 
of the trust for another without preparing a new trust agreement 
that incorporated the proposed amendment. Upon the settlor's 
death, the daughters contested the validity of the amended trust. 
In handing down it decision, the Washington court first 
commented that the record undoubtedly reflected the settlor' s 
intent and belief as to the validity of the amended trust. 
Nevertheless, the court determined that a trustor who merely 
substituted an amended page into an already existing trust had 
not met the formal procedural requirements for amending the trust 
and the court therefore invalidated the amendment. As the court 
stated: "Clear evidence of both intent and belief cannot 
substitute for actually, or substantially, doing what is 
required." id. at 1233. 
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In the present case, the facts are similar. However, in 
this case the two pages of purported amendments were not inserted 
into the original documents, but into an unexecuted photocopy of 
the 1992 will and trust that Mr. Reeves received at some point in 
time subsequent to the preparation of the purported amendments. 
To be candid, questions of fact abound with respect to the 
circumstances surrounding the 1999 amendment, with both Mr. 
Reeves and Mr. Piatt giving remarkably different accounts of the 
events. However, regardless of how these questions of fact are 
resolved, it is not disputed that Mr. Piatt only prepared two 
pages of proposed amendments which were subsequently inserted 
into a blank copy of the 1992 trust. Given the decision in Tosh, 
which is entirely in harmony with the Court* s decision in 
Continental Bank, this Court can clearly find that the alleged 
1999 amendment did not meet the procedural requirements needed to 
validly effect an amendment to the 1992 trust in accordance with 
the provisions set forth in section 3.1 regarding amendment, 
modification and revocation. Therefore, since Appellant' s entire 
claim hinges on the validity of the 1999 amendment, the Court can 
properly affirm the trial court' s order granting Appellees 
summary j udgment. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT QUESTIONS OF FACT 
PREVENTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT FROM BEING ENTERED FOR APPELLANT. 
Cross-motions for summary judgment are most properly viewed 
as the independent contention by both parties that they are 
entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law rather than a 
concession that no question of fact exists under the theory 
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advanced by the opposing party. Wycalis v. Guardian Title, 78 0 
P.2d 821 (Utah App. 1989), cert, denied, 789 P.2d 33 (Utah 1990). 
Ordinarily, the denial of a motion for summary judgment is not 
appealable. Christensen v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 443 P.2d 385 
(Utah 1968) . However, if the Court determines that Appellant can 
properly appeal the trial court' s finding that questions of fact 
existed with respect to Appellant' s theory of the case, then 
Appellees become the nonmoving party. As the nonmoving party, 
Appellees are entitled to have all evidence construed by this 
Court in the light most favorable to their position, Themy v. 
Seagull Enters., Inc., 595 P.2d 526 (Utah 1979), with some 
deference being accorded to the trial court' s application of law 
to fact. Montes Family v. Carter, 878 P.2d 1168 (Utah App. 
1994) . With respect to Appellant' s motion, the reasonable 
inferences drawn from the facts at bar demonstrate that material 
issues exist which may only be resolved by a trier of fact. 
A. THE PRESENCE OF UNDUE INFLUENCE IS A QUESTION OF FACT, 
Whether an undue influence contributed to the purported 
amendment of the 1992 trust is a question of fact that may only 
be resolved by analyzing the relationships between the decedent, 
the Appellant and Mr. Reeves to determine whether a confidential 
relationship existed which may have unduly affected the 
decedent's decision to amend her trust. UA confidential 
relationship arises when one party, after having gained the trust 
and confidence of another, exercises extraordinary influence over 
the other party. If a confidential relationship exists between 
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two parties to a transaction, and if the superior party (in whom 
the trust has been reposed) benefits from the transaction, a 
presumption of undue influence is raised." Estate of Jones v. 
Jones, 759 P.2d 345, 347 (Utah 1988) (citations omitted). The 
existence of a confidential relationship is a question of fact. 
Id. 
In the matter at bar, Appellees' case does not suffer from 
the failure of proof contemplated by Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. To the contrary, Appellees have not only 
demonstrated that genuine issues of fact exist, Appellees have 
raised issues upon which a trier of fact could reasonably find in 
their favor. This presentation of fact precludes entry of 
summary judgment in Appellant* s favor. 
Specifically, Appellees have called into question the 
circumstances preceding the decedent's amendment of trust. As 
set forth in the Statement of Fact, supra, and as amply 
demonstrated below, Appellees have cast doubt on Appellant' s 
version of these facts, which Mr. Piatt has called Ma complete 
fabrication." (R.370). For example, Appellee has shown that but 
for the interference of Kevin Reeves in the decedent' s personal 
affairs, the 1992 trust would have remained unaltered. Statement 
of Fact HH 14-21. Additionally, by Kevin Reeves' own testimony, 
he had developed a relationship of trust and confidence with the 
decedent. Deposition of Kevin Reeves, p. 18.12-19, p. 20.11-18. 
Appellant concedes this fact. Moreover, as the Appellant's 
beneficiary, Mr. Reeves stood to gain from any amendment of trust 
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which benefitted Appellant. When these facts are construed in 
the light most favorable to Appellees' position, it is clear that 
a presumption of undue influence has been raised which would 
invalidate the 1999 amendment, particularly in light of Mr. 
Piatt's pronouncement. 
Moreover, Appellees have presented evidence that can be 
construed as evidence that the decedent in fact attempted to 
resist Mr. Reeves' undue influence. In early 1999, Mr. Reeves 
began inquiring as to the state of the decedent' s personal 
affairs. (R.361). In response to these inquiries, the decedent 
gave answers which can be construed as being intentionally 
misleading in order to keep her affairs private: she told Mr. 
Reeves, untruthfully, that the Appellant was her beneficiary. 
(R.369). At substantially the same time that she was 
misrepresenting her affairs to Mr. Reeves, the decedent gave her 
daughter the original copy of the 1992 trust and the accompanying 
will along with the instruction that the daughter would need 
those documents upon the decedent's passing. (R.364). This fact 
can be construed as the effort by the decedent to keep her 
affairs secret from the Appellant and Mr. Reeves, and to 
guarantee that her true intent with respect to her estate would 
remain uncompromised. 
This reasonable inference gains credence in light of the 
Appellant' s own testimony: Appellant testified that the decedent 
had always told her that she was the decedent' s beneficiary. 
(R.369). If this testimony is true, then the decedent must have 
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known that any discovery of her trust would expose the fact that 
she had always misrepresented the true state of her affairs. It 
also creates the reasonable inference that the decedent must have 
known that were the documents discovered, she would be compelled 
to alter the documents, especially in light of the testimony that 
the decedent had a history of conceding to the Appellant. 
(R.370). In fact, this is precisely what happened. After 
keeping her affairs private for seven years, and notwithstanding 
the decedent1 s own efforts to conceal her true plans, Mr. Reeves 
obtained a copy of the decedent' s trust and the decedent was 
compelled to make the modifications. 
B, QUESTIONS OF FACT EXIST AS TO WHETHER MS. BANKS WAS 
COMPETENT TO EXECUTE A TRUST, 
Appellees are entitled to have all reasonable inferences 
surrounding questions of fact regarding the decedent' s competency 
drawn in their favor. The standard for determining requisite 
competency with respect to the execution of a trust is a higher 
standard than mere testamentary capacity and is, in fact, the 
identical standard required as to all contracts. Estate of 
loupe, 878 P.2d 1168 (Utah App. 1994). Thus, the test for 
competency is not whether the settlor was generally of a sound 
mind but whether the settlor had the power to comprehend the 
subject of the trust, its nature and its probable consequences. 
Walker v. U.S. General, Inc., 916 P.2d 903 (Utah 1996); Hilbert 
v. Benson, 917 P.2d 1152 (Wyo. 1996) (citing Restatement 2d, 
Trusts §§ 19, 333). In the instant case, in light of this 
standard, sufficient questions of fact exist to allow Appellees' 
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case to survive summary judgment. 
The decedent's competency affects two areas of this case: 
first, whether she was competent as the trust1 s settlor to effect 
a valid amendment of the trust, and second, whether she was 
competent as the trustee to receive the amendment. In the trial 
court, Appellees presented evidence which tended to show that the 
decedent' s competency was in fact diminished with respect to both 
roles. First, Appellees presented evidence that during her final 
weeks, the decedent became forgetful and repetitive in her 
conversations with her children. (R.372). In fact, Mr. Reeves 
testified that the decedent told him that she had lost her trust 
documents when she had, in fact, given them to her daughter. 
(R.372). Second, Mr. Reeves has stated that Ms. Banks did not 
understand the trust language when he read it to her and that he 
had to explain it in very simple terms. (R.372). Third, both 
Mr. Reeves and Appellant have testified that the decedent stated 
that she believed that Appellant was the original beneficiary of 
her trust. (R.372). 
If the decedent made this statement, and if, as Mr. Reeves 
testified, the decedent didn1 t understand the trust language when 
he read it to her, two reasonable inferences arise. First, if 
the decedent could not understand the original trust there is no 
reason to assume that she understood the amended trust. 
Second, if she didn' t understand the trust and was unaware of the 
identity of the beneficiary, she would be incapable of 
discharging her duties as the trustee. If she were incapable, 
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then she would be unable to accept delivery of the amendment 
under section 3.1. In any event, these facts give rise to 
inferences which can only be settled by a trier of fact. 
C. ONLY COMPLETE AND UNAMBIGUOUS CONTRACTS MAY BE 
INTERPRETED AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
Only when contract terms are complete, clear and unambiguous 
can they be interpreted as a matter of law. If the terms of a 
contract are in conflict, the party' s intent may only be derived 
by resort to extrinsic evidence. Colonial Leasing Co. v. Larsen 
Bros. Constr. Co., 731 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986). The instant case 
presents neither a complete nor facially unambiguous document. 
Therefore, contrary to assertions advanced by Appellant, the 1999 
amendment may not be interpreted as a matter of law. 
Unlike the 1992 trust, the 1999 amendment is incomplete and 
facially ambiguous. First, as set forth above, the 1999 
amendment is nothing but two pages of proposed changes which were 
inserted into a blank copy of the 1992 trust. Second, axiomatic 
rules of construction, set forth above in Homer v. Smith and 
Neilsen v. 0' Reilly, reveal the amendment's ambiguity: Article I, 
which states that the purpose of the trust was to benefit 
Appellees, cannot be reconciled with section 4.3 of the amended 
trust which states that Appellant was the beneficiary. Absent 
resort to extrinsic evidence, it is impossible to harmonize the 
two provisions and at the same time afford the provisions the 
meaning of their plain language. Therefore, this document may 
not be interpreted as a matter of law. 
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III. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY ADMITTED THE STATEMENTS MADE BY 
ATTORNEY JOSEPH PLATT. 
Whether the trial court correctly determined that the 
attorney-client privilege did not apply to the deposed statements 
of Mr. Piatt is a mixed question of law and fact. The legal 
conclusions of the trial court are reviewed for correctness while 
some deference will be accorded the trial court' s application of 
law to fact. Montes Family v. Carter, supra. 
Citing to Rule 504 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, Appellant 
argues that the deposed statements given by attorney Joseph Piatt 
which concerned Mr. Reeves' beneficial status were improperly 
admitted by the trial court because they did not fall within any 
of the five listed exceptions to the attorney-client privilege. 
Appellant* s analysis, however, has little bearing on the facts 
before the court; attorney Piatt did not divulge any information 
that he acquired during his representation of Appellant, and even 
if the privilege did apply, Appellant waived the privilege by 
failing to protect it. 
A. THE INFORMATION DIVULGED BY MR. PLATT WAS NOT 
DISCOVERED INCIDENTAL TO AN ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP. 
Utah Code Ann., § 78-24-8(2) states at relevant part: "An 
attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined 
as to any communication made by the client to him or his advice 
given regarding the communication in the course of his 
professional employment." In the instant case, because Appellant 
has not established that Mr. Piatt divulged any information that 
he acquired during the course of his professional of her, 
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Appellant cannot assert this privilege. 
This Court has commented previously on the attorney-client 
privilege and noted that "since the privilege has the effect of 
withholding relevant information from the factfinder, it applies 
only where necessary to achieve its purpose. Accordingly, it 
protects only those disclosures--necessary to obtain informed 
legal advice--which might not have been made absent the 
privilege." Gold Standard, Inc. v. American Barrick Resource 
Corp., 801 P.2d 909, 912 (Utah 1990) (citations omitted). Thus, 
"the privilege should be strictly construed with its object." 
Id. Although the Court stated that each case must be considered 
individually to determine whether the privilege applies, the 
Court did find two specific instances in which the privilege 
would be upheld: "1) for the purpose of forming an opinion as to 
the legality of a contemplated legal action, or 2) for legal 
analysis and advice as to the particular prospective litigation." 
Id. at 913. 
Neither of these two instances reflects the facts before the 
Court and applied to the present case, this standard favors the 
admission of Mr. Piatt' s statements. Appellant was not seeking 
Mr. Piatt' s legal advice when she informed him that Mr. Reeves 
was the beneficiary of her trust. Nor was she seeking advice 
about potential litigation. There is no evidence to suggest that 
Mr. Piatt prepared the trust which gave Mr. Reeves that 
beneficial status. And there is no evidence to suggest that Mr. 
Piatt' s representation of the Appellant extended beyond preparing 
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a trust for Appellant in 1992 which had by that time been revoked 
by Appellant. Thus, this Court should affirm the trial court's 
order with respect to Mr. Piatt's statement. 
B. APPELLANT WAIVED THE PRIVILEGE WHEN HER OWN ATTORNEY' S 
QUESTIONS ELICITED THE RESPONSE. 
Noticeably absent from Appellant' s brief is any reference to 
the fact that the responses given by Mr. Piatt to which Appellant 
now objects were in response to a series of questions posed by 
her own attorney. Even if the privilege had otherwise applied, 
its divulgence under these facts constitutes a waiver of the 
privilege under Rule 507(a) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Rule 507 (a) states: 
A person upon whom these rules confer a privilege against 
the disclosure of the confidential matter or communication 
waives the privilege if the person...voluntarily discloses 
or consents to the disclosure of any significant part of the 
matter or communication, or fails to take reasonable 
precautions against inadvertent disclosure. 
The Advisory Committee Note, subparagraph (a) then states: "Since 
the purpose of evidentiary privileges is the protection of some 
societal interest or confidential relationship, the privilege 
should end when the purpose is no longer served because the 
holder has allowed some disclosure or made disclosure." 
In the instant case, Appellant allowed the disclosure to 
which she now objects. Her own attorney phrased three 
consecutive questions which were designed to elicit the 
responses. Significantly, it should be noted that because Mr. 
Bullock did in fact ask three questions, that Rule 507(b)(2) 
should not apply. This simply is not a case where Mr. Piatt made 
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the disclosure before Appellant could assert the privilege. 
Rather, Mr. Piatt answered a question posed to him by Appellant' s 
counsel. Upon Mr. Piatt's answer, Appellant's counsel, rather 
than asserting any privilege, then asked two consecutive 
questions designed to clarify Mr. Piatt's response. Thus, under 
Rule 507(a), even if the privilege had otherwise applied 
Appellant waived the right to assert this privilege. Thus, the 
trial court' s order should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons cited above, Appellees respectfully request 
this Court to affirm the trial court' s order granting them 
summary judgment; the terms of the 1992 trust are clear and 
unambiguous. By interpreting that trust as the trial court did, 
the trial court gave full weight and effect to each of the 
trust's explicit terms. Alternatively, this Court can conclude 
that the 1999 amendment fails as a matter of law. 
However, even if this Court determines that the trial court 
erred in interpreting the 1992 trust, this Court should refrain 
from granting Appellant's motion for summary judgment; not only 
is the 1999 amendment an incomplete and ambiguous document, 
questions of fact abound as to whether the decedent executed the 
1999 amendment while she remained free from undue influence or 
while she was mentally competent either to make or receive such 
amendment. 
Finally, this Court should affirm the trial court' s order 
admitting statements made by Mr. Piatt; the information divulged 
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by Mr. Piatt was not acquired incidental to an attorney-client 
relationship and was only divulged pursuant to questions asked by 
Appellant's own counsel. 
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